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Abstract—The fast-growing smart applications on mobile devices leverage pre-trained deep learning models for inference. However, the
models are usually not updated thereafter. This leaves a big gap to adapt the new data distributions. In this paper, we take a step further
to incorporate training deep neural networks on battery-powered mobile devices. We identify several challenges from performance and
privacy that hinder effective learning in a dynamic mobile environment. We re-formulate the problem as metric learning to tackle overfitting
and enlarge sample space via data paring under the memory constraints. We also make the scheme robust against side-channel attacks
and run-time fluctuations. A case study based on deep behavioral authentication is conducted. The experiments demonstrate accuracy
over 95% on three public datasets, a sheer 15% gain from multi-class classification with less data and robustness against brute-force and
side-channel attacks with 99% and 90% success, respectively. We show the feasibility of training with mobile CPUs, where training 100
epochs takes less than 10 mins and can be boosted 3-5 times with feature transfer. Finally, we profile memory, energy and computational
overhead. Our results indicate that training consumes lower energy than watching videos and slightly higher energy than playing games.
Index Terms—On-device machine learning, privacy preservation, deep metric learning, behavioral authentication
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1 INTRODUCTION
Propelled by the latest advance in mobile processors,
smartphone becomes an ideal platform to conduct deep
learning tasks at the data source. Without offloading private
data to the cloud and consuming data bandwidth, users
enjoy more coherent interaction and better experience. This
trend quickly reignites innovations in the saturated mobile
industry as new applications quickly emerge from photo
classification, beauty enhancement, text prediction, speech
recognition and movement tracking [1]. Since deep neural
networks are compute-intensive, the recent efforts mainly
focus on improving computation and memory efficiency by
quantization [2], model compression/sparsification [3]–[5]
and distillation [6], [7]. These techniques can be applied
during model deployment to reduce run-time redundancies
on mobile devices.
Most of the existing applications and optimizations focus
on inference from a pre-trained model, whereas leave training
on battery-powered mobile devices largely unexplored.
Nevertheless, being able to infer from a static model still
has a significant gap from being cognizant, since machine
learning relies on the assumptions that the test samples are
independently and identically drawn from the same distribu-
tion of training. Deep classifiers are not good at extrapolation
when data comes from a different distribution, but it is
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quite common in mobile applications. Take the ongoing
research of behaviorial authentication [8]–[11] and activity
recognition [12], [13] for example, behaviorial patterns may
evolve due to sickness, injury and emotion, thus intensify the
intra-class variations and hamper classification. This requires
the model to adapt to the new distribution, where constant
training and finetuning are expected. Therefore, being truly
intelligent should bring training back into the loop.
Due to resource consumption, a natural solution is to
securely offload training to the cloud. For example, one can
host an enclave for each client in the cloud [14], securely
aggregate training data from users, keep all the models
updated and provide downlink accessibility on-demand; or
use homomorphic encryptions to obfuscate both private data
and model, while the cloud can still conduct meaningful
computations on encrypted data or model weights [15]–[17].
Other options include pre-processing to (randomly) project
user data into non-sensitive representations [18], which is
yet to offer a rigorous security guarantee and often comes
with an accuracy loss.
Can we incorporate training on mobile devices as well? In
addition to the foreseeable challenges of computation and
power, what are the gaps between mobile environments
and machine learning that limit deep learning algorithms to
perform as they should? Previous efforts have studied deep
learning on mobile platforms. However, these platforms
have no essential difference from the cloud setting with
proprietary GPU and external power. By contrast, in this
paper, we consider battery-powered smartphones running
Android that are thermally and electrically limited.
Mobile environments have fundamental difference from
the cloud in terms of labeled data, where labeling is usually
crowdsourced offline. Despite the abundance of mobile
data, interactive labeling from the user degrades useability,
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2whereas having a small dataset would lead to overfitting
and low accuracy. Second, since the read access to many
sensors is not restrictive [22]–[25], learning should take extra
precautions to these side channels, especially in security-
critical applications. Third, mobile data is inherently noisy;
decisions based on a one shot of inference is not reliable.
Multiple inferences should be fused across the spatial-
temporal domain for a more confident decision. Finally, as
training typically takes hundreds of epoches using back-
propagation, it requires to speed up the convergence in a
privacy-preserved manner.
This paper takes a first step to tackle this multi-faceted
challenge from accuracy and privacy. It is realized through a
comprehensive use case study of deep behavioral authenti-
cation, a promising, second-factor authentication that does
not require deliberate attention from users. For accuracy, we
re-formulate the classification problem in a different way
by making samples into pairs under the device’s memory
constraint, and learn a deep metric to mitigate overfitting
due to data scarcity [26], [27]. Then we develop a space-
time decision fusion algorithm to enhance the reliability of
decisions in dynamic mobile environments. The inference
results are fed back to schedule model training hence close
the loop of learning. For privacy, we develop a defense
mechanism to reject fraudulent samples sniffed from side
channels. It is achieved by embedding a noise fingerprint
inside the sensing signal and supervising the neural network
to distinguish between genuine samples from the ones with
noise perturbation. We also implement feature transfer to
speed up training convergence on mobile, while securing all
the intermediate activations/model parameters. The main
contributions are summarized below.
• We conduct both training and inference on battery-
powered mobile devices to preserve privacy and
learn effectively in a dynamic mobile environment.
The implementation on Android demonstrates that
training is not only feasible but also quite fast with
feature transfer (within 5s/epoch on Huawei Mate10
for 400 samples).
• We tackle the overfitting problem due to the lack of
labeled data by paring samples under the memory
constraint and learn a deep metric to enhance the
discriminative power of the model. In our case
study, we analyze and evaluate various types of
data representations and loss objectives thoroughly.
Our experiments demonstrate 10-15% improvement
of authentication accuracy on different datasets and
achieve an accuracy of 0.94 on a large dataset with
153 participants.
• We successfully mitigate potential side-channel leaks
and reduce attack success ratio below 10% while
preserving usability of benign applications.
• We evaluate the framework extensively on public
datasets and profile learning performance and cost
on various smartphone models. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work that implements both
training and inference, and addresses the associated
challenges on battery-powered mobile devices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
studies related literatures. Section 3 and Section 4 present the
system model and design. Section 6 evaluates the framework
through a case study and Section 7 concludes this work.
2 RELATED WORKS
2.1 Privacy Preservation
Privacy preservation has been extensively studied recently
in the machine learning community. The research mainly
focuses on three different directions. The first is the al-
gorithmic direction such as differential privacy [28] and
data projection [18]. Differential privacy introduces noise
into the training process so adversaries cannot detect the
presence or absence of a user [28]. Autoencoder is utilized
to transform sensitive features into a latent space for non-
sensitive inference [18]. Since these approaches have to
make a balance between useability and privacy, it is hard
to provide rigorous security guarantees and there is always
an associated cost of accuracy loss. The second direction is
homomorphic encryption that allows curious third parties
to perform meaningful computations on encrypted data [15],
[16]. CryptoNets use fully homomorphic encryption to
encrypt the data from the client and receive an encrypted
prediction from the cloud. A square activation function is
adopted to bridge the gap between the cryptographical
and neural operations, which is only suitable for inference
computation. The work of [15] designs a two-party protocol
to protect both the data and the model using a partially
homomorphic encryption. Since homomorphic encryption
and decryption are computationally intensive, the computa-
tion, energy and network overhead would be prohibitive for
mobile devices.
From the system perspective, the third approach is to
implement computations directly at the data source, so
private information never leaves the device. The existing
works either develop new variants of applications such as
activity recognition [12], [13] and mobile vision [29], [30],
or explore the design space to optimize the performance
of conducting inference on mobile devices [2]. These tech-
niques aim to reduce the run-time redundancy of the neural
networks. A direct method is to round the original model
parameters in 32-bit floating point to 8-bit integer, so 75%
size can be saved [2]. Another approach is to prune the
connections with near-zero weights either after training [4]
or during training [5] for a sparse network. A large and
complex teacher network can be also used to train a small
student network for comparable results, thus distilling the
knowledge to run the small network on mobile devices [6],
[7]. These methods are effective for running inference on
mobile devices. Nevertheless, they left training out-of-the-
loop, especially in the applications [12], [13], [29], [30]. This
leaves the model without a continuous, timely engagement
to the dynamics in mobile applications. This work fills such
gap by exploring the challenges of training on mobile devices
from an application perspective.
2.2 Behavioral Authentication
Smartphone features a variety of sensors to capture behav-
ioral information using acceleration, gyroscope, etc. Behav-
ioral biometrics such as gait [8], [9], keystroke dynamics [10]
and eye movement [11] are proven to be successful in
3differentiating human subjects. They reflect the internal
characteristics of a user, and are difficult to replicate. A
system process can run continuously in the background for
implicit authentication with no deliberate attention from
the user [31], which makes behavioral biometrics an ideal
second factor for authentication. Based on statistical features,
the previous works focus on using deterministic algorithms
or classifiers with less discriminative power [8], whereas
data outliers, abrupt changes could easily mislead these
techniques. Deep neural networks are used in [32] to train a
homogeneous model for recognition. Yet, they do not address
issues of where and how the model should be trained and
the potential threats from side channel leaks when the deep
learning algorithms are implemented on mobile devices.
3 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND MODEL
In this section, we describe the system architecture and threat
model for the deep behavioral authentication, whereas the
general framework shares similarities with other sensing
applications such as activity recognition. The proposed
system is depicted in Fig. 1.
Threat Model. The authentication module reads authentic
sensor data from the standard API (e.g., SensorManager
in Android). We assume that sensor data is trustworthy as
its integrity can be protected by hardware security extension
technologies such as ARM TrustZone [34]. Meanwhile, sensor
data is available to all applications, including malware,
since modern OS like Android or iOS does not set re-
strictions to accessing sensors. By exploiting sensor data
(e.g., accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer), numerous
side-channel attacks [22]–[25] have been reported to sniff
PIN/swipe patterns, password, app usage or even speech.
We assume that attackers attempt to break the biometric
authentication by utilizing sensor data.
The main performance metric is the authentication accu-
racy, measured by whether the system can defend against
spoofing attacks and recognize its owner. Specifically, we
consider two types of attackers: passive and active. Passive
attackers [10] use their own data or samples from a large
database to spoof the authentication system. This case is
common since a random attacker may obtain a device lost by
the victim. Without any prior knowledge on the behavioral
pattern, the passive attacker can only retrieve data from
a large public database and launch brute-force attacks to
unlock the device. Active attackers can directly and stealthily
collect sensory data from the user’s smartphone. This could
be achieved by tricking the user into installing a third-party
app. We further assume the powerful active attacker can
generate the exact same gait pattern as the sniffed sensory
data by programming an apparatus such as a robot [35].
One effective countermeasure to side-channel attacks is
sensor data obfuscation [24], which injects random noise to
user-level apps so that malware cannot recognize sensitive
operations. The noise level should balance the usability of
benign apps while obfuscating malicious ones. Thus, to
mitigate side-channel attacks, the obfuscation technique
is employed in the target smartphone by wrapping the
SensorManager API. For instance, Slogger [36] can inject
noise into various sensor outputs. The noise is transparent to
the authentication module, which is integrated in the mobile
operating system. While applications (including malware)
can only obtain obfuscated data through the wrapped
interface, they can apply various denoising techniques to
restore the original data.
Finally, the communication between the device and the
cloud is secured by SSL. Since our design is centered around
on-device implementation, the cloud only plays a secondary
role to provide samples from the negative classes. We assume
cloud providers are honest but curious: they follow protocols
but are free to use what they see to learn private information
from users.
4 FRAMEWORK DESIGN
This section presents the main design of the framework, in-
cluding the learning technique, decision-making mechanism
and opportunities to speed up the computation.
4.1 Deep Metric Learning
Although the smartphone accumulates considerable sensing
data at runtime, labeling requires external efforts from the
user. For example, the authentication application would ask
the user to record a segment of behavioral data during the
bootstrapping phase and use these as the ground truth for
training. Existing approaches of classification typically use
the softmax loss to output a probability for each predicted
class. With a total of k classes and n samples in each class, it
learns from the O(kn) samples. For each class, the softmax
function only examines the n samples. When n is small, the
model might be subject to serious overfitting and perform
poorly during the test time.
A solution is to make samples into pairs so each sample is
paired with the rest O(kn) samples, and a similarity distance
metric can be learned using the Siamese Network [26], [27].
This way, the input is expanded by a factor of kn and the
discriminative power is enhanced. As shown in Fig. 1, the
Siamese Network incorporates two branches of identical
convolutional neural networks that share model weights.
They take a series of convolution, nonlinear activation and
downsampling to yield feature vectors ϕ1, ϕ2, and merge
into a top network to learn a distance metric function
f(ϕ1, ϕ2). It is constructed with the contrastive loss function
to map feature vectors to a space in which similar samples
have closer distance whereas dissimilar samples are far apart
(separated by a margin). For a pair i, j of dataset D, the
contrastive loss function is defined as,
Lc =
∑
i,j∈D y(ϕ
(i)
1 , ϕ
(j)
2 )f(ϕ
(i)
1 , ϕ
(j)
2 )
2 +
(1− y(ϕ(i)1 , ϕ(j)2 ))max(m− f(ϕ(i)1 , ϕ(j)2 ), 0)2, (1)
in which label y(ϕ(i)1 , ϕ
(j)
2 ) = 0 for dissimilar pairs and
y(ϕ
(i)
1 , ϕ
(j)
2 ) = 1 for similar pairs. m is the margin. If the pair
is similar (positive), the loss is f(ϕ(i)1 , ϕ
(j)
2 )
2; if the pair is
dissimilar (negative), the loss is max(m− f(ϕ1, ϕ2))2. When
f(ϕ1, ϕ2) > m, the loss is zero, i.e., dissimilar pair with
distance larger than the margin has zero loss.
Joint Loss. A slightly different loss function Ls is pro-
posed in [27], that maps dissimilarity into a probability
prediction with sigmoid activation so the network can be
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Fig. 1: System architecture on mobile devices: ¶ it takes raw sensor inputs, transforms them into mid-level representations
(spectrograms [33]); · processes the representations with the neural network; ¸ computes a distance metric from the feature
vectors; ¹ generates a decision; º backpropagates the error if training is scheduled.
trained with cross-entropy loss. The advantage is that no
margin needs to be pre-determined,
Ls =
∑
i,j∈D y(ϕ
(i)
1 , ϕ
(j)
2 ) log p(ϕ
(i)
1 , ϕ
(j)
2 )+
(1− y(ϕ(i)1 , ϕ(j)2 )) log(1− p(ϕ(i)1 , ϕ(j)2 )). (2)
The construction of the loss function plays an important role
to capture similarity in different applications. To capitalize
from the potential advantages of distance and probabilistic
metrics, we combine them into a new joint loss function.
The goal is to minimize the total loss Lt with a balancing
parameter α,
Lt = Lc + αLs, (3)
where Ls is the cross-entropy loss in Eq. (3) and Lc is the
contrastive loss in Eq. (1). α is a scalar used for balancing
the two functions. We take l2-normalization of distance
f(ϕ1, ϕ2) = ‖ϕ1 − ϕ2‖2 and evaluate these different for-
mulations in Section 6.
4.2 Memory-efficient Sampling
Training takes batched input in memory sampled from
flash storage. To avoid the latency accessing the storage,
the system maintains a pool of sampled pairs in memory.
This makes sampling crucial because of data balance and
increased memory footprint. Consider authentication as an
extreme case, where the number of negative samples is much
larger than the positive ones (from the device owner). Denote
variables of ns negative classes of s samples (supplied by
the cloud as discussed next). For the mobile user with r
samples, there are r2 positive pairs and the nsrs negative
pairs (nsrs  r2). Since loading all the negative pairs into
memory may lead to memory leaks, the goal is to keep a
random subset of negative samples within memory limits.
We develop a balanced reservoir sampling algorithm
based on [37]. A buffer size of 2R is found from hardware
configuration or test (half for positive and half for negative
pairs). The size determines a trade-off between memory
usage and variety of negative records. Small R could lead
to severe overfitting and large R risks of having memory
error. To maximize coverage, we set R = r2 so all positive
samples are utilized for training and make sure that the total
size of 2R is within the memory capacity. The algorithm
Algorithm 1: Memory-efficient Sampling
1 Input: r2 positive and nsrs negative pairs, memory bound 2R.
2 Output: a balanced set of samples of size 2R.
3 Set of all negative pairs N , R = r2, |N |= nsrs.
4 for T ← 1, · · · , R do
5 R← R+ (i ∈ N ).
6 for T ← R+ 1, · · · , nsrs do
7 if probability p > R
T
then
8 R← R− (i ∈ R) + (i ∈ N ).
continuously adds record into the reservoir till the (T +1)-th
record, T = R. If T > R, a random pair in the reservoir
is replaced with probability RT or rejected with probability
1− RT . After the sequential pass through all the records, the
buffer forms a random set from the pool of negative samples.
4.3 Decision Fusion and Feedback
After the model is trained, the inference module takes input
from sensors and outputs a classification decision. The
decision based on a single shot of inference is not reliable
because interference, outliers, and behavioral instability
persist at run-time. The goal is to reach a high confidence
within minimum observation time. We build an algorithm
on top of the inference module to fuse multiple inferences
across spatial and temporal axes. For data xi at time i, we
first perform spatial selections from the training samples. xi
is paired with k samples randomly selected from the training
set on mobile, since one training sample is not sufficiently
representative. The mean distance di from k random samples
di =
∑k
j=1 d(xj , xi)/k is computed.
Not only could the selection of training samples have
imperfections, the incoming data may also have disturbances.
After the spatial evaluation, we progress along the time
dimension to fuse multiple decisions {y1, y2, · · · , yn}. After
the i-th evaluation, it either decides to accept (H0), reject (H1)
or continue to observe yn+1. The module defines two kinds of
errors: false negative α and false positive β. The objective is
to minimize the expected time of evaluation and satisfy
the error constraints, which is formulated as Sequential
5Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) [38]. SPRT progresses by
assessing a likelihood ratio λn for the n-th observation,
λn =
p(y1, · · · , yn|H1)
p(y1, · · · , yn|H0) =
n∏
i=1
p(yi|H1)
p(yi|H0) . (4)
The second equality holds because samples are indepen-
dently randomly drawn. We extend SPRT for the distance
metric (contrastive loss). Pairs with distance less than the
margin threshold (typically set to m/2) are considered as
similar; otherwise, they are dissimilar. We use a normal dis-
tribution to model the distance into probability distribution,
p(di|µ, σ2) = 1− φ(di − µ
σ2
), (5)
in which (µ, σ2) is set to (m2 , 0.25) in the experiment.
Distance around 0 or margin m has high probability being
similar or dissimilar, and lower probability around m2 when
the classifier is unsure. Combining (4) and (5), the ratio is,
p(yi = 0|H1)
p(yi = 0|H0) = φ(
di − µ
σ2
)/(1− φ(di − µ
σ2
)) (6)
p(yi = 1|H1)
p(yi = 1|H0) = (1− φ(
di − µ
σ2
))/φ(
di − µ
σ2
) (7)
The strategy is proven to be optimal if the following decision
is made,
S∗n =
 H0, λn ≤ BH1, λn ≥ Acontinue,B < λn < A (8)
We set the two thresholds A and B suggested by [38], A =
(1− β)/α, B = β/(1− α). The sequence moves within the
open interval (B,A) till a decision is made. Intuitively, if
consecutive decisions of acceptance are made, the likelihood
ratio shrinks multiplicatively. Any rejection along the way
would drive the ratio to an opposite direction towards the
upper threshold until a threshold is met. The decision of S∗n
is examined closely to schedule training.
Feedback. We examine the testing accuracy as a feedback
to schedule model re-training and adapt variations. Again,
take authentication as an example, if the decision outputs a
false negative, the screen is mistakenly locked by the (second-
factor) behavioral authentication, but the user later logins
with her face or fingerprint (that verifies the decision is
indeed a false negative). If such situations exceed a certain
number, it indicates that the user’s behavior may have
undergone a substantial change and training is scheduled
with a mix from the new data. Incorporating training
on mobile could immediately respond to these deviations
thereby closing the loop of learning on mobile devices. The
scheme is summarized in Algorithm 2 and evaluated in
Section 6.8.
4.4 Defend Side-channel Leaks and Active Attacks
Although well-trained neural networks could achieve high
accuracy, the sensitive data might be also leaked via side
channels. Since acquiring data from the motion sensors
does not require any permissions, curious third parties
could exploit these data to infer health or mental condition
such as predicting Parkinson’s disease, depression from gait
patterns [46], [47]. Further, skilled attackers can trick the
user into downloading an app that stealthily captures the
Algorithm 2: Decision Fusion and Feedback
1 Input: Testing pairs (xj , xi), 1 ≤ j ≤ k. k pairs randomly drawn
from training set. False negative α and false positive β,
threshold A = (1− β)/α, B = β/(1− α).
2 Output: Decision S∗n and training schedules.
3 Initialize false negative counter c← 0, and threshold T .
4 while c < T do
5 n← 0
6 while B < λn < A do
7 di ←
∑k
j=1 d(xj , xi)/k, p(di|µ, σ2)← 1− φ( di−µσ2 ).
8 λn ←
∏n
i=1
p(di|H1)
p(di|H0) .
9 if λn ≥ B then
10 S∗n ← 1 and Break.
11 if λn ≤ A then
12 S∗n ← 0 and Break.
13 n← n+ 1
14 Output optimal decision S∗n.
15 if Given true label H0, S∗n = H1. then
16 c← c+ 1
17 Schedule training ofMt with new data Dt.
motion data, and then replay them to gain the access via
programming an apparatus [35].
A typical countermeasure is to obfuscate the sensor
output by injecting random noise [24]. However, our ex-
periments show that simply injecting random noise into the
sensing signal still fails to fully prevent the attack. Specifically,
we obfuscate the data with a zero-mean gaussian noise, whose
standard deviation is set to equal the original signal over a
moving window. As circled in the middle picture of Fig. 2(b),
this obfuscating operation introduces a few new energy
components at higher frequencies in the spectrograms, which
enable the authentication module to recognize attackers to
some extent. Fig. 2(c) shows the attacker’s success ratio.
Without any protection, the attacker can easily accomplish 80-
100% success rate (the true positive rate). With noise injected,
the success rate drops to an average of 50%. However, this
success rate is still not sufficiently secure. In extreme cases,
some individuals are still subject to 100% attack success rate
even when noise is injected.
One reason that simple noise injection does not work
here is that neural network is robust to random noise.
It extracts a meaningful combination of features towards
a minimization of the loss objective, and serves as an
information bottleneck that finds a compressed mapping of
input that preserves maximally possible information of the
output [39]. Thus, redundant information including small
noise and interference, which does not interfere with the
main structure, is thrown away. As a result, the attackers can
still succeed. Obviously, a successful obfuscation requires
raising the standard deviation of the noise (e.g. surpassing
the std of the signals) to generate larger noise. However, it
will inevitably impact the usability of legitimate apps.
Furthermore, attackers can apply various denoise tech-
niques to potentially raise the success rate if the original
waveform is not changed by the denoise method. In our
preliminary experiment, we measure the attackers’ success
rate by applying two denoise methods: total variation
proximity operators [40] and 1D gaussian filter. As shown in
the spectrograms in Fig. 2(b), the new energy components
at higher frequencies are removed by denoising. In our
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Fig. 2: Preliminary assessment of simple noise injection (a) raw sensing data with/without noise; (b) relevant spectrograms;
(c) attacker’s success ratio.
experiment, by applying appropriate denoising methods
on Mcgill and ZJU datasets, attackers can achieve higher
success rates.
Our approach. We propose a new defense mechanism
against strong adversary by making a small extension,
that supervises the neural network to learn the injected
noise and use it as a hidden fingerprint. In particular, our
approach develops on the fundamental that the power of
neural networks can even fit unstructured random noise
with random labels [41]. If the pair of genuine and noised
data (genuine plus noise) is labeled as negative, we are
supervising the Siamese Network to map them into different
areas in the feature space. Then, the noise data becomes a
hard example [42] that looks similar to the genuine one. With
the superb memorization capability of the neural network,
it is also able to fit the noise part in brute force. By labeling
them as negative, the system forcibly learns their nuances,
whereas the attacker can only sniff/use the noise data and get
rejected by the system. While the naive way of noise injection
requires a large noise level for successful obfuscation, boosted
by the unique feature of neural network, our approach
can significantly reduce the required level of noise without
sacrificing much usability.
To mitigate the impact of possible denoising from the
attacker, the system can further predict the potential classical
denoise algorithms that might be used by attackers. The
authentication module can generate the denoised pairs
beforehand and similarly label them as negative for training.
The detailed evaluation of our proposed defending system is
presented in Section 6.7.
4.5 Speed up Convergence via Privacy-Preserved Fea-
ture Transfer
Training learns hundreds of thousands of parameters through
backpropagation, which could take more than hundreds
of epochs till convergence. The previous work proposed
to partition the neural network between the cloud and
mobile device in a layer-wise manner [21]. We build on this
approach to speed up convergence via feature transfer. With
domain similarities, knowledge learned from the source can
be efficiently repurposed for the target domains. For neural
networks, the high-level features learned from the first few
layers are more generic, while the low-level features are more
specific to the classification tasks [43] (e.g., the early layers
learn general features like edge detectors to identify the
concentration of frequency energy from the sensing signals).
To initiate, the cloud (source) and the mobile (target) agree
on a partial network structure of the first k layers, e.g., the
first two convolutional layers. The agreement includes the
model weights and hyper-parameters. For the target model,
a few adaptation layers are introduced. Thus, the high-level
features could be efficiently reused on user’s mobile device.
We can utilize a source model Ms trained on the public
dataset with ns classes in the cloud, and transfer the learned
features for the nt classes in the target modelMt, when the
source and target domains do not overlap.
Specifically, samples x from the source domain are passed
throughMs until the k-th cutoff layer, where x is represented
as an n-byte feature vector. Next, the model parameters
Ms are transferred to the target model Mt for the first k
layers, along with all the feature vectors (transmitted via
a secure channel - SSL). To initiate training on mobile, the
target model freezes weights of the first k layers. The error is
backpropagated from the last layer to the (k+1)-th layer. The
weights of the adaptation layers are adjusted according to
stochastic gradient descent. Note that the cloud is not aware
of the layer structure or model weights beyond the k-th layer
on the mobile devices. We show by experiments that this
approach has great potentials of adaptation, such as allowing
the source and target to have different loss functions (softmax
forMs and contrastive loss forMt) and heterogenous sensor
hardware with different sampling frequencies. The target
model can still learn effectively and enjoy massive speed-up
of convergence with little accuracy loss.
Remarks on privacy: Other than the active attackers,
privacy exploits attempt to reconstruct the original data from
feature activations [44] or model parameters [45]. Our design
is robust against these exploits since: 1) activations generated
from the target model are kept on mobile thus curious cloud
providers cannot invert the private data; 2) though data can
be recovered from the shared weights of k layers on mobile
by curious users, the data is public and carries little business
value; 3) the model weights beyond the k-th layers on mobile
are not disclosed to anyone else, hence a third party cannot
recover private data from the model parameters.
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Fig. 3: t-SNE visualization (best view in color; each color represents samples from an individual) (a) raw walking data (b)
nine statistical features (c) spectrogram.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
5.1 Data Pre-processing
Data processing lays the foundation to achieve high accuracy.
Here, we formally discuss the intuition behind using spectro-
grams to represent sensing signals gathered by accelerometer
sensors. Unlike images, the accelerometer signal is one-
dimensional time series. Existing research mainly works
in the time-domain and requires cycle extraction [32] or
segmentation [25]. Cycle extraction looks for cyclic patterns
between local minima or maxima algorithmically, but is
prone to error in the presence of noise. Segmentation divides
the signal into many overlapped pieces that expands the
dataset by many folds. Here, we adopt a new approach
to model walking data as speech and demonstrate its
advantages in the following.
Walking consists of a set of motions from the body parts
(torso and limb), which shares similarities with speech from
their generation mechanisms. While speaking, the pulse from
vocal cords is modulated in frequency through the throat
cavity and reshaped by the articulators (tongue, mouth,
lips) to produce sound. Gait signals generate a similar
pattern from the body parts. Based on these observations,
it is reasonable to model gait as speech, which is typically
analyzed in spectrogram [33].
A spectrogram uses three dimensions to represent signal
energy as a function of time (x-axis) and frequency (y-
axis). It breaks data into segments of short intervals, takes
short-time Fourier transform in each segment and assigns
frequency spectrums into different bins of magnitude. Each
bin stands for the frequency scale perceived. Spectrogram
concatenates multiple quasi-stationary cycles to generate a
2D output. This way, learning can be performed effectively
using convolutional neural networks.
A compelling advantage of spectrogram is suggested
by Fig. 3 (visualized by the t-SNE tool to reduce the high-
dimensional data into 2D [48]). Fig. 3(a) shows the raw
sensing signal and Fig. 3(b) visualizes the data with nine
statistical features. Though these statistical features form a
distinguishable trend, they are still not powerful enough; in
sharp contrast, data points are clustered in a more organized
manner in Fig.3(c), so it is much easier to build a classifier
and recognize different individuals.
5.2 Model Development
Model architecture determines learning capability, memory
requirement, and computational intensity. In this paper,
we evaluate three convolutional neural network architec-
tures extended the families of LeNet [49], VGG [50] and
MobileNetv2 [3]. Though an alternative is to use the recurrent
neural networks, their computation intensity are much higher
on the mobile devices. We customize these classic models to
add or prune layers in order to yield similar input dimension
at the dense layer as their original implementation with
the ImageNet. The spectrograms of (x, y, z) axis are stacked
vertically to form 33× 42 images.
In particular, LeNet repeats two blocks of 5× 5 convolu-
tional and max pooling layers followed by densely connected
layers. We add one more 3×3 convolutional layer and prune
one dense layer to get 4 weight layers (therefore the name
LeNet4). VGG repeats two 3 × 3 convolutional layers to
achieve similar receptive field with the 5×5 convolution, but
much less computation/parameters. Multiple such blocks
are stacked to learn complex relations among the features.
We repeat the blocks three times and introduce one more
convolutional layer before the last max pooling, thus making
VGG8 a heavy-weight network with 8 weight layers. We
also implement the latest MobileNetv2. The model stacks
inverted residual blocks (inv res bl) to take low-dimensional
representation, and then expands to the high-dimension for
efficient feature extraction by the depthwise convolution.
The blocks are connected with bypass links to make deeper
structures trainable with less degradations. The max pooling
layer is replaced by a convolution stride of 2, e.g. (1, 1, 2)
represents two blocks with a stride of 1 followed by a block
with a stride of 2. Table 1 summarizes the model architectures
and layerwise parameters.
5.3 Mobile Development
The choice of the software framework is crucial since training
requires backpropagation. Despite a handful of available
frameworks, most of them (e.g. Tensorflow Lite [51]–[53]) have
tailored backpropagation and left only the inference part to
compute from pre-trained models. This way, no intermediate
gradient values need to be stored and the memory/code
can be optimized. In this paper, to enable training on the
mobile device, we develop the system on a Java-based
framework called DL4J [54]. Since the two Siamese branches
8are identical, only one copy of the model is stored in memory.
During testing, we notice that deeper structures could cause
OutOfMemoryError due to a large number of parameters
and batched data processing. To mitigate, we set largeHeap
to give the application a 512 MB heap capacity.
6 USE CASE STUDY OF BEHAVIORAL AUTHENTI-
CATION
This section conducts a thorough evaluation based on the
deep behavioral authentication. The main goals of the evalu-
ations are: 1) investigate the accuracy and computational cost
of different models and approaches; 2) examine cost savings
and performance impact from feature transfer; 3) validate
system robustness against both random and active attacks;
4) profile performance and overhead on various smartphone
models.
6.1 Dataset and Experimental Settings
To make the benchmarks comparable, the experiments are
based on public datasets: Mcgill [55], IDNet [56], ZJU [57]
and Osaka [58] gait datasets. Note that this paper focuses
on algorithm design and system integration rather than
collecting, analyzing or deriving data from human subjects.
Thus, an IRB approval is not required. With a total coverage
of around 1,000 individuals, we believe the four datasets are
sufficient to validate the system in various scenarios.
In particular, Mcgill includes 15-min walk of 20 people
on two different days. IDNet is collected in a more vibrant
environment with different types of phones and dresses from
50 people. ZJU collects gait data from 153 individuals in
3 different sessions using 5 body sensors of low sampling
rates. Osaka records 1-minute walk of 744 subjects. Due to
short recordings (only 1-2 spectrograms), we cannot perform
meaningful training so it is utilized as a large database from
which attackers may launch random attacks. Since some
individuals have much less or missing data in IDNet and ZJU,
we remove those individuals for data balance. This ultimately
brings them to 30 and 136 individuals respectively.
The datasets are split into 80% for training and 20%
for testing. For the siamese network, the training set is
generated by randomly pairing training samples with testing
samples. This simulates the run-time when new motion data
is evaluated against training samples as the ground truths.
To assess the performance of authentication, we mainly focus
on the mean Average Precision (mAP), which is the average
percentage of true authentication over the total number of
testing. We also evaluate the trade-offs between false rejection
(the genuine user is falsely rejected) and false acceptance (an
imposter is falsely accepted) using different margin threshold.
We set the margin m = 1.5 in the contrastive loss (Eq. (1))
and α = 0.1 in the joint loss (Eq. (3)). For fast prototyping, we
first develop the model and evaluate authentication accuracy,
security and performance in Tensorflow [51] with Nvidia Tesla
P100 GPU, and then develop the learning module on Nexus
6/6P, Huawei Mate 10 and Google Pixel2 using DL4J [54]. A
large batch size of 128 is used while training on GPU. During
our testing, we find that the maximum batch size for Nexus
6 (oldest phone in our test) is 56 pairs. To test various models
and avoid memory errors, we set the batch size to 20 on
mobile.
6.2 Authentication Accuracy
We first evaluate the authentication accuracy by comparing
models, data representation and learning mechanisms on
different datasets in Table 2. We validate the choice of
spectrogram by comparing with the pre-processing technique
of sliding window (SW) [25] on the temporal data both using
softmax (cols. 1, 2). As envisioned by the t-SNE visualization
of Fig.4, spectrogram achieves a significant accuracy gain of
over 10% (col. 4). A one-class SVM (osvm) is used in [32]
to detect outliers from imposters. It takes features from the
last convolutional layer learned from the softmax function
to train an osvm using positive samples only. Unfortunately,
though osvm can handle 80-90% outliers, it fails to generalize
to the positive samples, which results in high rate of false
rejections. Thus, the total accuracy is just slightly better than
random guesses (col. 3).
Softmax vs. Contrastive Loss. Our motivation to use the
Siamese Network is because of the higher discriminative
power on small data. To validate, we first visualize the
features learned by softmax and siamese (contrastive loss) in
Figs. 4(a) and (b), where the colors represent the feature
vectors of different subjects in 2D. Features learned by
softmax are not sufficiently discriminative where the distance
along the feature vectors from the same individual could be
similar to a different individual. We further notice that some
features belong to different individuals are mapped to the
same vector space in 2D. These findings are in line with [59]
(softmax tends to underperform). Contrastive loss from the
siamese network offers improvements by mapping feature
activations into a condensed, compact set of spaces. This
validates the higher discriminative power of deep metric
learning than softmax especially with less training data. Not
only via feature visualization, the authentication accuracy
also indicates 8-15% improvements between the two methods
(col. 2 and 4-6 of Table 2).
Binary vs. Multi-class Classification. We discuss the
impact of formulating the problem into either the binary or
multi-class classification problem. Multi-class classification
requires all the pairs between different classes to be labeled
whereas binary only labels one vs. the rest. The former
is more suitable for recognition tasks where a centralized
model is trained to identify different users. The recognition
model can be also migrated to the mobile devices for
authentication [32]. However, it is subject to potential security
risks when a malicious end user attempts to invert training
data of other individuals [45]. In addition, we investigate
the performance gap between the two formulations in terms
of model accuracy.
To simulate limited mobile storage, only 20% data from
the training set is used for binary classification but evaluated
on the entire test set. This is challenging for recognition since
the neural network can only “see” from a small subset of
training data. A model is trained for each individual and the
results are averaged. Fig. 4(c) visualizes binary classification.
It only distinguishes the positive samples from the rest and
the negative samples can be mapped to similar locations
in space without causing an error. Nevertheless, multi-
class classification still has to separate all the individuals
by a margin, which makes it difficult to differentiate hard
samples (Figs. 4(a)(b)). To test the scalability of multi-class
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LeNet4 VGG8 MobileNetv2
#layer blocks # param. # layer blocks # param. # layer blocks # param.
32×conv2d(5, 5)+pool 0.96K 2× (64×conv2d(3, 3)+pool) 39.2K conv2d(3, 3, 2) 1.9K
64×conv2d(5, 5)+pool 51.5K 2× (128×conv2d(3, 3)+pool) 222.5K (16, 32)×inv res bl(1, 1, 2) 47.3K
32×conv2d(3, 3) 51.4K 3× (128×conv2d(3, 3)+maxpool) 444.3K conv2d(1, 1) 1.1K
dense(128) 82.5K dense(128) 327.8K dense(64) 61.8K
contrastive/x-entropy loss 186.36 K contrastive/x-entropy loss 1033.8K contrastive/x-entropy loss 112.1 K
TABLE 1: Summary of model architectures
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Fig. 4: Multi-class and binary classification via t-SNE visualizations (a) softmax (multi-class); (b) siamese (multi-class); (c)
siamese (binary); (d) accuracy vs. user number. (Best view in color)
baseline siamese multi-class siamese binary-class (20% data)
softmax(sw) softmax(spgm) osvm contrastive x-entropy joint contrastive x-entropy joint
M
cg
ill LeNet4 0.774 0.881 0.542 0.918 0.940 0.925 0.966 0.934 0.975
VGG8 0.752 0.902 0.672 0.925 0.952 0.931 0.962 0.906 0.973
Mobilenet 0.682 0.811 0.581 0.865 0.926 0.923 0.847 0.901 0.957
ID
N
et LeNet4 0.726 0.842 0.552 0.884 0.903 0.910 0.937 0.899 0.943
VGG8 0.764 0.875 0.561 0.916 0.934 0.915 0.908 0.901 0.941
Mobilenetv2 0.770 0.776 0.591 0.876 0.912 0.867 0.910 0.921 0.945
Z
JU
LeNet4 0.442 0.646 0.511 0.681 0.804 0.779 0.941 0.926 0.972
VGG8 0.463 0.743 0.523 0.769 0.841 0.800 0.936 0.851 0.981
Mobilenetv2 0.591 0.471 0.510 0.706 0.778 0.743 0.895 0.835 0.921
TABLE 2: Model accuracy of different loss functions for the siamese network
classification, we show the results in Fig. 4(d) by increasing
the number of classes in IDNet. The accuracy declines with
a growing number of classes in the system. Hence, model
capacity should keep growing as new users subscribe to the
service. This would require extensive maintenance efforts in
distributed mobile environments. As projected in Fig. 4(d),
accuracy is independent from the system scale using binary
classification with a fixed network architecture.
Table 2 summarizes the overall accuracy comparison.
With multi-class classification using the Siamese Network,
accuracy still declines a little with an increasing number of
classes (e.g. from 0.952 of Mcgill with 20 people down to
0.841 of ZJU with 136 people). By reducing the problem into
binary classification, the accuracy stays above 90%. Among
them, the new joint loss accomplishes the best accuracy with
over 95% correctness. This is because the joint loss balances
the two loss functions and combines the model outputs for
higher fidelity.
We also notice some interesting phenomenon that the
cross-entropy loss is better than the contrastive loss for multi-
class classification, but the opposite for binary classification.
The difference between them is that the cross-entropy gen-
erates a probabilistic decision, rather than a deterministic
distance metric from the contrastive loss. In our experiment,
we discover that contrastive loss is more prone to error
during multi-class classification in the presence of hard
samples. Due to space limit, we would further investigate
this issue in our future work. Finally, we alter the model into
VGG8 and MobileNetv2. VGG8 achieves the best accuracy in
most cases. With 40% less parameters, MobileNetv2 suffers
8-26% accuracy loss compared to LeNet4. This indicates that
networks particularly optimized on model parameters and
computer vision tasks may perform poorly on mobile sensing
tasks, compared to simple solutions of stacking convolutional
layers such as VGG8.
6.3 Resource Requirement
To quantify the performance and resource requirements of
the mobile sensing task, we conduct more experiments to
illustrate the relations between model parameters, floating
point operations (FLOPS), and accuracy in Fig. 5. We alter
the structures by shrinking/expanding filter size, numbers,
and adding/removing convolutional or pooling layers. For
the same model, in general, more parameters bring higher
representational power at the risk of overfitting and cost
of computation. From Fig. 5(a), VGG8 is more stable than
others in terms of accuracy. Once the number of parameters
exceeds a million, the models tend to overfit. Mobilenetv2
can be tailored to only weigh half of LeNet4, but the
performance is not stable. Fig. 5(b) also indicates that it incurs
nontrivial GPU time if the FLOPS increase. Fig. 5(c) shows
that LeNet4/VGG8 are more competitive than Mobilenetv2
for the datasets in terms of computation time and accuracy.
To facilitate mobile development, we conduct the fol-
lowing experiments using LeNet4 and keep the consistency
through the rest of the experiments. Fig. 5(d) shows the
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Fig. 5: Evaluation of resource requirement vs. accuracy on GPU and mobile platforms using IDNet (a) mAP vs. parameters;
(b) FLOPS vs. GPU time; (c) GPU time vs. mAP; (d) Parameters (Conv and Dense Layers) vs. Mobile CPU Time.
training time per epoch on mobile devices. We plot in 3D
for better visualization of the impact from the convolutional
and dense layer. Training on mobile devices is not only
feasible, but actually much faster than expected. For a deep
model with 650K parameters and 400 samples, it only takes
the latest Pixel2 or Mate10 less than 5 seconds to complete
one training epoch. Thus, training 100 epochs takes less
than 10 mins. Even the old Nexus 6 finishes around 10
seconds per epoch. During the experiment, we notice that
the speed bottleneck of convolutional layers is magnified on
mobile devices due to less processing power from the mobile
CPUs and memory. As observed in Fig. 5(d), with more
convolutional layers, training time surges sharply. However,
increasing computations of the dense layer has less impact
on performance. Interestingly, we are even able to train some
networks with over a million parameters, as long as most
of the parameters reside in the dense layer. Equipped with
the capability to learn, model updates can be scheduled
efficiently without external efforts from service providers.
6.4 Speed up on Mobile by Feature Transfer
Since convolutional layers learn common features, these
features can be efficiently transferred from the cloud for
computation efficiency. To see such potential, the following
cases are evaluated: 1) freeze all convolutional layer weights
(fconv1-3); 2) freeze first two convolutional layer weights
(fconv1-2); 3) freeze the first convolutional layer weights
(fconv1). We train the rest of the layers. The source model
conducts multi-class classification on the dataset (public)
without the presence of the target user (private). At the
target user, it performs the binary classification based on the
weights transferred from the source model. Note that this
implementation is robust against privacy exploits since the
private activations are kept on mobile and the transferred
features are public. We also evaluate scenarios when different
feature transfer Mcgill IDNet ZJU gain/loss
M
cg
ill
fconv1-3 0.933 0.903 0.907 -5.2%
fconv1-2 0.948 0.927 0.918 -3.5%
fconv1 0.953 0.941 0.948 -1.9%
gain/loss -2.1% -4.2% -4.2% –
ID
N
et
fconv1-3 0.876 0.941 0.896 -3.3%
fconv1-2 0.922 0.951 0.911 -0.9%
fconv1 0.933 0.957 0.936 +0.5%
gain/loss -2.7% +1.3% -2.3% –
Z
JU
fconv1-3 0.808 0.810 0.829 -12.5%
fconv1-2 0.836 0.818 0.833 -11.3%
fconv1 0.832 0.804 0.847 -11.3%
gain/loss -11.6% -13.0% -10.5% –
TABLE 3: Accuracy with feature transfer
public data are available, by alternating the source data
between the other two datasets. This allows us to examine
the generality of features and their impact on accuracy and
convergence. If the source and target models permits easy
domain adaptations, the cloud no longer needs to tightly
match the hardware configuration with the user device.
Fig. 6(a) shows the convergence of a random individual
from the Mcgill dataset. We can see that feature transfer
offers at least two orders of magnitude speed-up in terms
of convergence. Features learned from data gathered with
different settings offer significant boost as well. For instance,
for the loss value to converge to 0.05, the original training
takes 325 epochs. With feature transfer, it only takes 2 epochs
from the same dataset, 5 and 4 epochs for different IDNet
and ZJU datasets, respectively. We then evaluate the speed-
up on mobile devices and measure the total computation
time to finish 50 epochs of training, as shown in Fig. 6(b).
Freezing all the convolutional layers offers 3-5 times of speed-
up. If one additional convolutional layer is released, the
gain is still over 2 times. The speed-up comes with a little
accuracy loss due to the discrepancy among domain features
(illustrated in Table 3). Training the dense layers only has
3-5% accuracy loss on Mcgill, IDNet, and 12% on ZJU dataset.
The accuracy can be improved by fine-tuning more layers
(e.g. to 0.9% and 3.5% for Mcgill and IDNet). Transferring
from a different dataset only incurs minor accuracy loss (1-
3% on average). This indicates that the proposed architecture
is robust to re-use features for the new target domain, though
device settings such as sampling frequency (sensors) can be
different.
6.5 Robustness against Intra-class Variations
We show that incorporation of training on mobile devices
offers fast response to intra-class variation when behavioral
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Fig. 7: Acceptance rate across different sessions (a) Mcgill; (b)
ZJU.
Dataset All Batch 4 Batch 8 Batch 16 Batch 32
Mcgill 0.05% 0.003% 0.003% 0.000% 0.000%
IDNet 2.36% 2.18% 2.014% 1.682% 1.024%
ZJU 0.346% 0.028% 0.010% 0.004% 0.001%
TABLE 4: Success ratio of passive attacks using Osaka dataset
biometrics evolve. We utilize the Mcgill and ZJU datasets
since they record more than two sessions of a subject on
different days (Mcgill) and months (ZJU). To see whether
the system can still recognize its owner, we examine the
acceptance rate. If the acceptance rate is low, the model
is likely to reject the genuine user and degrade usability
significantly. In the upper figures (no training) of Fig. 7, each
user trains a model in session 1 and directly tests on the
data from session 2. As we observe, the acceptance rate is
quite low if the model is not updated. Mcgill dataset across
several days only yields 16.3% average acceptance, and the
rate drops to 1.1% for ZJU over a longer period. It certainly
indicates that pre-trained models cannot adapt to new data
distributions.
With continuous model updates, we fine-tune the model
from the previous weights with a lower learning rate, and
only use 20% of the new data. The bottom figures in Fig. 7
shows the mean acceptance percentage over all fine-tuning
epochs, which quickly brings it back to 92.4% and 77.6% for
Mcgill and ZJU, respectively. The best acceptance percentage
of some users can hit 100% indicating that the fine-tuned
model can almost perfectly adapt to the new data.
6.6 Robustness against Random Attacks
A random attacker tries to gain system access using his own
walking data (gait) or data retrieved from a large database.
Since behavioral patterns are extremely difficult to mimic
by observation, we use Osaka as the database to launch
attacks. These samples are entirely new to the model from
unknown data distributions. We train users in the three
datasets and enumerate through all the attacking samples
(1684 spectrograms) for each user. As shown in Table 4, the
success ratio is below 3%. Once the results are fused with 32
samples randomly selected from the training data, the ratio
further declines to 1% in the worst case. This rate could be
easily reduced to zero by incorporating high-level security
mechanisms such as limiting the number of trials.
6.7 Robustness against Active Attacks
Next, we evaluate the system robustness against active attacks.
Sec. 4.4 has shown that simple noise injection does not work
well for obfuscation. In addition to Gaussian noise, we further
evaluate Laplacian and Uniform noise with the standard
deviation set to the original signal over a finite moving
window. Laplacian noise is also used in differential privacy
for mathematical tractability. We adopt the three types of
noise to evaluate their properties regarding obfuscation
and impact on usability. We choose a typical application
of pedometer step counter to assess usability in the presence
of noise. Fig. 8 shows the attacker’s success ratio versus the
pedometer error for different noise distributions. We alter the
input in three ways. 1) noise/train: noise samples are paired
with genuine ones in the training set and labeled as negative.
2) denoise/no train: attacker applies a state-of-the-art denoise
technique called total variation proximity operators [40] on
(1). The classifier takes no countermeasure. 3) denoise/train:
the classifier makes a successful prediction about the denoise
scheme and labels the denoise pairs as negative for training.
Fig. 8(a-b) indicate that the proposed mechanism is
capable of defending against active attacks when the Siamese
Network is supervised to learn the difference from the attack
samples (noised or denoised). Learning the noised signals can
drop the success rate from 50% to less than 10%. However,
without considering possible denoise from the attacker in
the classifier, there is still around 20% success rate even
when the neural network has learned the noised signals.
Once denoise is considered in training, the attacker can no
longer succeed. For usability, the noise distributions incur
7-13% error for the step counter. IDNet gathered from a
more vibrant environment has higher intra-class deviations.
When the standard deviation of noise is set to as large as the
original signal, the step counter is subject to a higher error
rate.
An anomaly is ZJU in Fig. 8(c), in which body sensors
of low sampling rate are used. The additive noise has
much higher frequency thus is bound to be filtered out
by the neural networks. The error of step counter is almost
doubled due to the local peaks of the noisy spikes being
mistakenly recognized as gait cycles. Using random noise,
we do not see much security improvement but a sharp
usability degradation. Instead of noise distributions with
high frequency, we further test a sinusoidal wave with a
low frequency (identical to the gait signal with a much
smaller amplitude). The sine wave is merged into the sensing
signal and difficult to extract since the oscillating frequency
is kept as a secret. On the other hand, the new frequency
components are evident enough to be recognized by the
neural network through training. As shown in Fig. 8(c),
the attacker’s success ratio quickly drops to nearly zero
for most of the 136 individuals in ZJU. Our new finding
suggests that random noise is not always a good solution to
balance security and usability. The actual obfuscation should
be considered with respect to the types of data source. For
a better balance of security and usability, obfuscation with
hidden regularity can be considered as a signature.
6.8 Other Important Metrics
This subsection evaluates factors that are equally important
during implementation. Fig. 9(a) shows time durations of
making batched inference on mobile devices (from 4− 56).
Since less parallel resources are available on the mobile
platform, the inference time increases almost linearly with
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Fig. 8: Defend active attacks through side-channel leaks (a) Mcgill; (b) IDNet; (c) ZJU.
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Fig. 9: System metrics (a) batched inference time on mobile (b) SPRT for positive samples (c) speed of training convergence
with different margins (d) equal error rate (Mcgill).
the input batch size. The computation takes less than 1.5s for
all the devices. Table 4 indicates that a batch of 32 samples
is robust against random attacks. It takes less than 0.5s on
Pixel2/Mate10 and 1s on Nexus 6/6P. If a single batch is
not reliable, the system progresses to SPRT as described
in Section 4.3. Fig. 9(b) demonstrates the decision-making
process. We set the false rejection/acceptance requirements
to α = β = 0.01. When the likelihood ratio hits the upper
shaded area, the decision is to reject; otherwise, the decision
is to accept. Normally, 5-6 batch iterations are needed to
reach a confident decision. This takes about 6s and 1.5s on
Nexus 6/6P and Pixel2/Mate10 respectively. To see how the
evolution fluctuates, we select some hard samples and mix
them with random samples. The classifier is less confident
based on the single batch and it progresses to the next
iteration until a shaded region is hit. The process can be
thought as a competition between the decisions to either
accept or reject. If a majority of the new data indicates
positive, the decision is inclined to accept though a few false
ones may drag the curve towards the opposite direction en-
route. As we can see, SPRT reduces authentication instability
at a little cost of extended response time.
The authentication algorithm introduces a margin param-
eter in Eq. (1). It defines the boundaries between samples
in high-dimensional feature space. In our testing, m = 0.5
maps the negative pair distance to around 2 and m = 3
maps it to 4.5. Intuitively, a small margin may lead to higher
error rate because dissimilar pairs are closer in feature space
and possibly misclassified as similar, or vice versa. A large
margin makes it difficult to train the classifier in terms of
slower convergence as shown in Fig. 9(c). For balancing the
rates between false acceptance and false rejection, we set
m = 1.5 and enumerate the margin threshold from 0.1 to 3
in Fig. 9(d). If the distance is below the margin threshold, the
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Fig. 10: Trace of memory/object allocation during mobile
training (a) Nexus 6; (b) Pixel 2.
test pair is similar and dissimilar otherwise. For Mcgill, our
framework achieves an equal error rate (EER) around 96.3%
when the margin threshold is set to 12m.
6.9 Profile System Overhead
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Fig. 11: Profiling battery power and CPU frequency of
different applications
Memory. We use the Android Profiler to measure the
memory consumption of the app during training in Fig. 10.
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To save space, we show the traces of Nexus 6 and Pixel
2 (the oldest and newest of our collection). Nexus 6 has a
quad-core of 4× 2.7 GHz. Pixel 2 features an octa-core with
4× 2.35 GHz plus 4× 1.9 GHz CPUs. Once the app starts, it
loads the native code, training samples and network model
into the mobile memory. Sample paring is conducted on the
device at the beginning. Since DL4J is not optimized for the
mobile environment, the native/code occupies about 130 MB.
When training is initiated, new objects are allocated and once
the app approaches the assigned memory limit, a garbage
collection is triggered to release the objects, which could
pause the app for a minimum amount of time (several ms).
When multi-threads are enabled in DL4J with OpenBLAS,
the training process enjoys much better performance with an
octa-core processor on Pixel 2. Hence, we see a steeper line
of object allocation on Pixel2, which completes the training
by only half of the time with Nexus 6.
Battery Power and CPU Frequency. We profile the
battery power using the Monsoon power monitor [60] and
CPU frequency by the Trepn Profiler [61]. We measure the
battery power and average CPU frequency of the 4 cores
on Nexus 6 while (1) training, (2) playing angry bird, (3)
watching an MP4 video in MX player, and (4) idling, in
Fig. 11. Training runs at 2.0 GHz set by the default governor
and its battery power consumes at the level of 2000 mW,
which consumes about 1% total battery during 2.5 mins.
Training introduces an additional 28% energy overhead
compared to angry bird, but consumes 25% less energy
compared to watching a video. The results suggest that
training consumes more energy than mobile games but
less intensive than watching videos. Since model update
is less time-sensitive compared to interactive apps, it can
be delegated as a background service and scheduled on-
demand while the phone is charging or idling. The default
CPU governor can be also adjusted adaptively to optimize
performance and power consumption.
7 CONCLUSION
This paper incorporates training on mobile devices and tack-
les the privacy and performance challenges when deep learn-
ing algorithms are migrated to resource-constrained battery-
power devices. A comprehensive framework is designed
to mitigate overfitting, side-channel leaks and maintain
high authentication accuracy. The framework is evaluated
with a use case study of deep behavioral authentication
and our extensive experiments demonstrate the security
and robustness of the proposed design against intra-class
variations and imposters that are out-of-distributions. We
anticipate the presented system would offer insights and
opportunities to enhance deep learning on mobile devices.
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